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FACTORS EXPLAINING MANAGEMENT
PREFERENCES OF ACCOUNTING
FOR GOODWILL PRIOR
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IFRS 3
A Cross-Country Study*
Emita W. Astami
Bambang Hartadi
Greg Tower
This study provides evidence on the cross sectional relationship
between firm economic variables and management preferences in
the selection of an accounting technique for goodwill. It examines
goodwill accounting policy disclosures in the 2000/2001 annual
reports of 269 listed companies in the five countries: Australia, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The key focus is
management’s choice of accounting techniques for the treatment of
goodwill.
The results show that accounting practices for goodwill vary
significantly across country of origins and across industry groups.
Two economic variables significantly explain management prefer-
ences of accounting for goodwill. The finding shows that the higher
a company’s financial leverage ratio the company managers prefer
to write off goodwill immediately against income or to capitalize and
amortize it in a sorter period of time. The higher a company’s size,
* An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 17th Asian Pacific Conference on
International Accounting Issues, Wellington, New Zealand, November 20-23, 2005.
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Introduction
This study examines factors that
affect management’s choice of ac-
counting techniques for the treatment
of goodwill. To achieve its objective
this study conducted two steps of analy-
sis. First, it investigates the effects of
industry and country of reporting on
management’s choice of accounting
techniques for the treatment of good-
will. Second, it examines its economic
determinants. Using annual reports for
the year 2000/2001 from listed compa-
nies in five countries including Aus-
tralia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, and Singapore, this study scruti-
nizes the relationships between the
explanatory variables and accounting
choice for the treatment of goodwill.
The explanatory variables derived from
the traditional Costly Contracting
Theory are size, leverage, and profit-
ability. This study provides empirical
evidence regarding the relationships
between economic variables and man-
agers’ preferences for the treatment of
goodwill based on a cross-country
study.
This study is carried out based on
the five countries located in the Asia
Pacific region. Five quite different na-
tions are selected. There are four rea-
sons for the country selection. First, in
each sampled country there is an es-
tablished stock exchange requiring
listed companies to publish their an-
nual reports. Second, annual reports
published by companies in each coun-
try have English versions available.
Third, diversity across these five na-
tions regarding financial attributes is
sufficient to expect that any variation
will be measurable if the factors are
significant explanatory values. Aus-
tralia, Hong Kong and Singapore are
considered as developed markets while
Malaysia and Indonesia are emerging
markets (Saudagaran and Diga 1997).
Thus, diversity is again enhanced. Fi-
nally, the accounting professions in all
five countries are members of Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board;
therefore, they are expected to follow
International Accounting Standards
(IAS)/International Financial Report-
ing Standards (IFRS). Thus, the crite-
Keywords: accounting for goodwill; costly contracting theory; a cross-country
study
the more likely the company would write-off of goodwill to balance
sheet reserves. Thus, this study provides empirical evidence that
management preferences of accounting for goodwill have economic
consequences.
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ria of country selection above are ex-
pected to provide diversity for the
sample yet all these countries are fully
compliant (or moving towards) the
IFRS.1 In this study, the primary re-
search question is:
What are the factors that explain
management’s choice of account-
ing techniques for the treatment of
goodwill?
The remainder of the paper is or-
ganized as follows. Section 2 outlines
the accounting for goodwill followed
by Section 3 which provides the theo-
retical framework and develops the
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the
research approach followed by Sec-
tion 5 that discusses the empirical find-
ings and their implications. Section 6
concludes the paper by addressing the
contributions of the study and ideas
for future research.
Accounting Treatments of
Goodwill
The long-lived debate has culmi-
nated in the impairment test of ac-
counting for goodwill by replacing
IAS 22 with IFRS 3.2 This new stan-
dard prohibits the amortization of good-
will. Instead, goodwill must be tested
for impairment at least annually in
accordance with IAS 36 Impairment
of Assets [IFRS3.54].
Prior to IFRS 3, the treatment of
goodwill is a controversial and an in-
creasingly important financial report-
ing issue. IAS [22.20] states that:3
Goodwill is the difference between
the cost of the acquisition and the
acquiring enterprise’s share of the
fair values of the identifiable as-
sets acquired less liabilities as-
sumed.
Previous studies such as Wines
and Ferguson (1993) and McCarthy
and Schneider (1995) note that the
controversy regarding goodwill in the
accounting profession has existed since
early 1900s, not only in the US, but
internationally as well. They argue
that the main issue is whether goodwill
should be recognized as an asset, and
then if goodwill is recognized as an
asset, further controversy exists re-
garding its treatment and link to the
income statement. That is whether
goodwill should be amortized, and if
so, what method should be used and
for how long (Brookes 1995).
According to IAS 22, that is su-
perseded by IFRS 3 effective 1 Janu-
ary 2005, the treatment of goodwill is
as follows:
Goodwill arising on the acquisi-
tion should be recognised as an
asset and amortised over its useful
life. There is a rebuttable presump-
tion that the useful life of goodwill
1 Australia and Indonesia did not allow the unusual use of direct write off to reserve but it was
allowed in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. Overall, it is felt that the sampled companies still
had a wide range of accounting policies to choose from.
2 IFRS 3 superseded IAS 22 on 31 March 2004.
3 http://www.iasplus.com/standard/ias22.htm (accessed on 22 May 2004).
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will exceed 20 years. [IAS 22.44]
IAS 22 indicates that the 20-year
maximum presumption can be
overcome “in rare cases” –for in-
stance if the goodwill is so clearly
related to an identifiable asset or
group of identifiable assets that it
can reasonably be expected to pro-
vide benefits over the entire life of
those related assets. Amortisation
will normally be on a straight-line
basis. [IAS 22.50]
Goodwill is subject to the general
impairment requirements of IAS
36. [IAS 22.55] If the amortisation
period exceeds 20 years, recover-
able amount must be calculated
annually, even if there is no indica-
tion that it is impaired. [IAS 22.56]
Non-amortisation of goodwill
based on an argument that it has an
infinite life is not permitted by IAS
22.
Prior to the implementation of
IFRS 3, the treatments of goodwill
vary among countries. Table 1 high-
lights the treatment of goodwill based
on IASB rules and each nation.
The observed variation in the
goodwill treatment between compa-
nies may be a result of the differences
in companies’ financial attributes. The
immediate write off of goodwill to
balance sheet reserves means that the
company’s reported income figures
would never be adversely affected by
amortization of goodwill. For example,
Weetman and Gray (1991) find that
profits under UK GAAP were 10.2
percent lower than under US GAAP
based on 41 UK companies in 1986
because of differences in their account-
ing treatment for goodwill. McCarthy
and Schneider (1995) suggest that for
many goodwill-reporting firms in the
US, goodwill is a significant contribu-
tor to debt/equity and debt/assets ra-
tios. At the other extreme, Miller (1973)
contends that the least harmful ap-
proach would be to write off goodwill
immediately against income. The de-
bate continues; this leads to variation
in practice.
The International Accounting
Standards Committee4 (IASC) revised
IAS 22 (Business Combinations) and
issued IAS 38 (Intangible Assets) in
1998. Other standard setters also have
recently changed their position. For
example, the US recently changed its
position on goodwill requiring good-
will to be capitalized and carried for-
ward, subject to impairment test,5 in-
stead of periodic amortization.
Goodwill is one of companies’
key intangible assets. Zingales (2000)
argues that intangible assets are one of
the main drivers of companies’ perfor-
mance. Furthermore, goodwill differs
from other categories of physical and
financial assets, for example its per-
ceived higher level of risk and uncer-
tainty has significant impact on the
level of agency costs. The above dis-
4 As stated earlier, the International Accounting Standards Board has superseded the IASC.
5 This is a crucial fundamental change to the accounting treatment for goodwill and is further
discussed in the implication section.
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Table 1. National and IASB Rules Placement for Accounting for Goodwill
National and Rule
IASB rules placement Treatment of goodwill
IASB Rules IAS 22 Goodwill should be carried out at cost less any
Business accumulated amortization and any impairment losses.
Combination The straight-line method should be adopted unless
there is persuasive evidence that another method is
more appropriate in their circumstances. The amorti-
zation for each period should be recognised as an
expense.
Australia AASB 1013 Goodwill is amortized to income over period not to
Accounting for exceed 20 years.
Goodwill
Hong Kong SSAP 30 Write off goodwill to reserves balance sheet in the
Business year of acquisition or amortized it.
Combination
Indonesia PSAK 22 Goodwill is amortized to income over period of 5
Accounting for years or more but not to exceed 20 years.
Business
Combinations
Malaysia MASB 21 Write off goodwill to reserves balance sheet in the
Busniess year of acquisition, write off goodwill to income
Combination statement in the year of acquisition, or amortized it.
Singapore SAS 22 Goodwill is recognized as assets and amortized by
Business using straight-line method for a period of 5 years.
Combination Other methods of the treatment of goodwill and amor-
tization up until 20 years are allowable if justifiable.
Source: Various sources
cussion indicates that the treatment of
goodwill is a crucial financial report-
ing issue.
Theoretical Framework and
Hypotheses Development
This study utilizes costly contract-
ing theory (Watts and Zimmerman
1986) to identify factors that might
explain management preferences for
particular accounting treatments of
goodwill. Costly contracting theory
(Watts and Zimmerman 1990) derives
from Jensen and Meckling (1976)
which concerned with the agency rela-
tionship attribute to contracts and
Coase (1937) that focused on transac-
tion cost reduction. These theories rec-
ognize that there are incentives for
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efficient and opportunistic choices of
accounting methods depending on the
completeness of contracts.
The presence of contracting cost
leads researchers to generate testable
hypotheses that explain and predict
accounting choice. Wong (1988) sug-
gests that based on economic theory
there is no reason to believe that the
manager as an agent will always act in
the best interest of the principal. Hence,
the agent may not act in the best inter-
ests of the principal in that the agent
may make some decisions that maxi-
mize the agent’s own wealth rather
than that of the owner. Scholars such
as Ball (1989) and Indjejikian (1999)
believe that managers are likely to
have a comparative advantage in se-
lecting an efficient set of accounting
policies and thus the suppliers of capi-
tal do not wish to eliminate all ac-
counting discretion. Warfield et al.
(1995) argue that since contracting
and monitoring are costly, not all of
managers’ opportunistic behavior is
eliminated nor is the latitude available
in the selection and application of ac-
counting techniques entirely removed.
Costly Contracting Theory has been
the most extensively employed in the
accounting literature to explain
management’s choice of accounting
policies. It hypothesizes that manag-
ers utilize the opportunity available in
both the contracts and accepted ac-
counting procedures in their self-in-
terest.
This paper examines the three
standard costly contracting theory hy-
potheses mainly interpreted in terms
of opportunistic management behav-
ior. This assumes that management
preferences for accounting choice will
be driven by a self-interest desire to
maximize management compensation,
to alleviate the tightness of debt cov-
enant restrictions and to minimize the
possibility of regulatory interference
(Watts and Zimmerman 1990).
Profitability
Where there are management
compensation schemes based on ac-
counting profits, which are affected by
the choice of goodwill accounting,
there will be preference for methods
not impacting adversely on reported
profit. This is the immediate write-off
to reserves methods.
Costly contracting theory suggests
that management compensation agree-
ments help reduce the conflict of inter-
est between company managers and
stockholders. Compensation agree-
ments that pay bonuses based on ac-
counting income will influence
management’s choice accounting
methods. Thus, company profitability
might be a factor affected by manage-
ment’s choice of accounting methods.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) note
that the bonus plan hypothesis has
been tested in several studies, that is,
ceteris paribus, managers of firms with
bonus plans are more likely to choose
accounting procedures that shift re-
ported earnings from future periods to
the current period. Accordingly, if part
of managers’ remuneration is derived
from incentive plans and management
incentive schemes are related to ac-
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counting earnings, then it is expected
that management have incentives to
use accounting methods that increase
accounting earnings (Hagerman and
Zmijewski 1979).
Alternatives accounting for good-
will result in different reported profits.
Immediate write-off of goodwill to
balance sheet reserves results a higher
reporting profit compared to the capi-
talization-based followed by amorti-
zation approach. Gore et al. (2000)
suggest that when there are manage-
ment compensation schemes based on
accounting profits influenced by the
effects of goodwill accounting, there
is a preference for methods not im-
pacting adversely on reported profits.
This is immediate write off to reserves
methods which is the most income-
increasing technique. Thus, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is tested:
H1: A firm’s profitability is positively
associated with the use of income-
increasing techniques for the treat-
ment of goodwill.
Financial Leverage
Dhaliwal et al. (1982) argue that
accounting methods are associated with
financial leverage because of the ex-
istence of restrictive covenants in the
firm’s credit agreements. The closer a
business is to breaching an accounting
based debt constraint, the more likely
it is for management to adopt account-
ing methods that increase income
(Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Debt
agreements usually include covenants
restricting the level of financial ratios
such as leverage, liquidity, and profit-
ability. Due to these constraints, man-
agement is expected to use income-
increasing accounting methods in or-
der to reduce the possibility of cov-
enant violations and avoid the possible
costs of renegotiation of debt agree-
ment. Therefore, managers of firms
with high leverage ratios are more
likely to choose accounting methods
that increase reported income. This
concept can be directly linked to the
examination of management’s selec-
tion for the treatment of goodwill.
Where a firm has accounting-based
debt covenant restrictions based on
income statement-based ratios, the firm
will prefer methods that do not reduce
profits. This is the immediate write-
off to reserves methods. Skinner (1993)
suggests that in a case where a firm can
only capitalize and amortize its good-
will, the firm would be expected to
amortize it for the longest period per-
mitted. For example, Hall (1993) sus-
pects that there is potentially an oppor-
tunistic motive for choosing a longer
period of amortization of goodwill to
mitigate debt-contracting costs. There-
fore, the following hypothesis is tested:
H2: A firm’s financial leverage posi-
tion is positively associated with
the use of income-increasing tech-
niques for the treatment of good-
will.
Political Visibility (Measured by
Size)
This paper suggests that the capi-
talization-based followed by amorti-
zation approach would be preferred by
large firms since it reduces profit com-
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pared to an alternative method which
is the immediate write-off to reserves.
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue
that management’s preferences for
accounting methods depend upon the
relative income effects of the methods
and the political visibility (size) of the
firm. They suggest that larger firms
tend to adopt accounting methods that
reduce or delay the reporting of in-
come.
This size hypothesis is based on
the assumption that large firms are
more politically sensitive and have
relatively larger wealth transfers im-
posed on them (political costs) than
smaller firms (Watts and Zimmerman
1986). The hypothesized relationship
between firm size and income effect of
the firm’s accounting methods has been
supported by empirical evidence such
as Watts and Zimmerman (1978);
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979);
Bowen et al. (1981); Skinner (1993);
and Dhaliwal et al. (1999). Large firms
have an incentive to choose account-
ing methods that reduce net income in
order to avoid profit-threatening regu-
lation. Large firms will prefer capitali-
zation-based approach for goodwill
treatment since it reports a lower profit
compared to the immediate write-off
to reserves. Linking this concept to the
study focus, the following hypothesis
is tested:
H3: A firm’s size is negatively associ-
ated with the use of income-in-
creasing techniques for the treat-
ment of goodwill.
Control Variables
Three control variables are also
examined. The relationship between
ownership structure and financial ac-
counting has also been hypothesized
based on the separation of company
management and ownership. Niehaus
(1989) suggests that these relation-
ships are based on two grounds: (i) a
potential conflict of interest between
managers and shareholders arises over
accounting method choices, and (ii) a
firm’s ownership structure in part de-
termines the resolution of potential
incentive conflicts. Thus, when there
is a high level of ownership concentra-
tion these majority shareholders can
also control the production of the firm’s
accounting information and reporting
policies. Smith and Watts (1992) be-
lieve that corporate policy, including
accounting choice, vary across firms
as a function of the investment oppor-
tunity sets (IOS). Myers (1977) sug-
gests that the market value of a firm
consists of two categories. These are
the future growth opportunities and
assets-in-place (AIP). Skinner (1993)
suggests links between the IOS and
accounting choice. The links may be a
direct relationship, between IOS and
the accepted set of accounting proce-
dures, and an indirect link through the
firm’s contracts between them. There-
fore, this study includes the level of
ownership concentration, IOS, and AIP
as control variables.
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Research Approach
Data was collected from a random
sample of 442 listed companies’ an-
nual reports for fiscal year ends rang-
ing from December 2000 to Septem-
ber 2001. As shown in Table 2, in the
year of study, total listed companies
from the five countries was 3.387
(Astami and Tower 2006). In the end
of 2000, 150 letters asking the latest
companies annual reports were sent
out to companies in each country stud-
ied. Then, from 442 reports received
only annual reports of companies re-
porting goodwill were selected. Based
on this purposive sampling, the re-
ports analyzed include 83, 102, 84, 93,
and 80 annual reports of companies
listed in the stock exchanges of Aus-
tralia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, and Singapore, respectively.6 Of
the 442 companies’ annual reports
examined 269 or 61 percent provided
information regarding goodwill. Table
2 shows the percentages of companies
reporting goodwill and providing their
accounting treatment for goodwill.
Classification Scheme for the
Treatment Methods of Goodwill
The dependent variable measures
the choice for goodwill treatments. In
line with Skinner (1993) the treatments
of goodwill are classified into income
increasing (decreasing) tendency, as a
measure of their impact on the re-
ported income. The treatment meth-
ods of goodwill are categorized and
assigned values ranging from 0 (the
most income-decreasing technique) to
2 (the most income increasing tech-
nique). The detailed classifications as
also done by Astami and Tower (2006)
are as follow:
1. A value of 0 for the immediate writes
off of goodwill to the income state-
ment in the year of acquisition.
2. A value of .5, 1, and 1.5 for amortiz-
Table 2. Sample Companies from Each Country Studied
Sampled Listed Companies Sample Reporting Goodwill
Countries Number of Number of
listed companies sample % n %
Australia 1.410 83 6 55 66
Hong Kong 746 102 14 88 86
Indonesia 316 84 27 17 20
Malaysia 529 93 18 49 53
Singapore 386 80 21 60 75
Total 3.387 442 13 269 61
6 The annual reports examined were those studied in Astami and Tower (2006).
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ing goodwill for less then 10 years,
10 to 19 years, and 20 years or more,
respectively.
3. A value of 2 for the immediate writes
off of goodwill directly to balance
sheet reserves in the year of acquisi-
tion.
The first and last choices are the
most extreme. Direct write-off of
Goodwill directly to a reserve is in-
come increasing in the sense that it
completely eliminates any goodwill
expense from impacting on the In-
come Statement, thus, it will never
decrease profit and the use of write off
against the balance sheet as the most
income increasing (see Endnote 1).
Those in the middle will reduce in-
come over a longer timeframe.
Country and Industry Effects
In addition to examining the rela-
tionships between economic variables
linked to the traditional Costly Con-
tracting Theory and management pref-
erences of accounting techniques for
the treatment of goodwill this study
also scrutinizes the effects of country
of origins and industry classifications.
Accounting Techniques for the
Treatment of Goodwill Across
Countries
The country, in whose stock ex-
change the firm is listed and is based,
is chosen as the control variable. Coun-
try of reporting is key societal factor
used as a broad descriptor to represent
different economic, legal, and politi-
cal systems. Several empirical account-
ing studies (such as Andrews et al.
1989; Tower et al. 1999; Street and
Gray 2002) indicate that the country
within which the company operates
affects the financial reporting system
of the company. Thus, it would be
expected that management’s choice
for accounting techniques for the treat-
ment of goodwill also differ across
countries. Table 3 summarizes man-
agement preferences in the selection
of an accounting technique for good-
will classified based on the country of
reporting.
Table 3 indicates the variations of
managements’ selection of goodwill
treatments across countries of study.
The mean score of the goodwill treat-
ment method of overall companies is
1.52 out of 2. Indonesian companies
employed far more income-decreas-
ing techniques for the goodwill with
the mean score of 1.09 out of 2, whilst,
Hong Kong companies interestingly
used the most income-increasing tech-
nique for goodwill with a mean score
of 1.91 out of 2 scale.
Overall, of 269 companies in the
sample with a stated goodwill ap-
proach, 117 or 43.5 percent wrote off
goodwill totally in the year of acquisi-
tion. This suggests that nearly half of
the transaction being against equity
reserves in the balance sheet. These
direct write offs are an extreme use of
an income-increasing accounting
policy in that direct write off to a
reserve will never reduce the profit
figure of this directly written off good-
will. Another six companies wrote off
goodwill in the year of acquisition
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directly to the income statement. There
surprisingly are only slightly more than
half of the companies (146 or 54.3%)
that amortized goodwill. The majority
of these companies amortized it for 20
years period or more. Systematic long-
term amortization of goodwill was used
most in Australia (78.2%), Indonesia
(58.8%), and Malaysia (49%).
Table 3 reveals that the most star-
tling treatment comes from the Hong
Kong sample with 90.9 percent of the
companies writing off goodwill to bal-
ance sheet reserves in the year of ac-
quisition, while some companies
(41.7%) in Singapore also did the same
thing. Conversely, none of companies
from Australia and Indonesia sample
did so. None of companies from Hong
Kong and Australia wrote off good-
will to the income statement in the year
of acquisition. A technique for amor-
tizing goodwill systematically in 20
years period or more (A1) is the most
common practice in Indonesia (58.8%)
and Malaysia (49%). However, the
distributions of the scores of each coun-
try were different. None of Singapore
companies used the A2 technique (10-
19 years of amortization). This seems
to indicate that companies in Singapore
tended to choose methods that were
either the more income increasing or
the more income decreasing tech-
niques.
Country of Origin Effects
Table 4 shows the results of the
one way ANOVA (Panel A), and the
post hoc tests (Panel B). Table 4 (Panel
A) shows the highly significant differ-
ences exist among the means of as-
signed score for goodwill treatment
methods in the five countries with a p
Table 4. Univariate Analysis of Goodwill Treatment Choices Across Coun-
tries
Panel A: One-way ANOVA
Significant at .000*
Panel B: One-way ANOVA– Tukey’s Post Hoc Tests
Country Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Singapore
Australia .000* .390 .984 .985
Hong Kong .000 * .000 * .000 *
Indonesia .215 .201
Malaysia 1.000
* Highly significant at p < .01 level; ** Significant at p < .05 level.
*** Moderately significant at p < .10 level.
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value of .000. Table 4 (Panel B) sum-
marizes the results of post hoc Tukey’s
test that tests pairwise multiple com-
parisons to determine which means
differ. It suggests that the mean of the
goodwill treatment methods of the
Hong Kong companies was highly sig-
nificant different from those of all
other four countries’ with a p value of
.000. Amortizing their goodwill, using
less income-increasing techniques for
the treatment of goodwill, is much
more common practices for the other
four countries. Thus, there are clearly
very strong country differences.
Accounting Techniques for the
Treatment of Goodwill Across
Industry Groups
It has been argued that firms with
high systematic risk, or which are
highly capital intensive, or which are
in highly concentrated industries, pre-
fer to use income decreasing account-
ing techniques (Hagerman and
Zmijewski 1979). However, they did
not find that the variables had a consis-
tent relationship with the income ef-
fect of the accounting methods they
examined. Watts (1992) suggests that
Table 5. Goodwill Treatment Choices Across Industry Groups for the Years
end 2000/2001
Policy WR* A1* A2* A3* WI*
Assigned score 2 1.5 1 .5 0
Industry n % n % n % n % n % n %
Core 53 100 37 69.8 10 18.9 1 1.8 3 5.7 2 3.8 1.73
Chemicals 20 100 12 60.0 6 30 1 5.0 0 0 1 5.0 1.70
Services 25 100 14 56.0 6 24 2 8.0 3 12.0 0 0 1.62
Property 26 100 16 61.6 5 19.3 1 3.8 3 11.5 1 3.8 1.62
Resources 35 100 12 34.2 13 37.1 3 8.6 7 20.0 0 0 1.43
Diverse 18 100 4 22.2 11 61.1 0 0 3 16.7 0 0 1.44
Retail 60 100 16 26.7 28 46.7 3 5.0 11 18.3 2 3.3 1.38
Food 32 100 6 18.7 17 53.1 2 6.3 7 21.9 0 0 1.34
Total 269 100 117 43.5 96 35.7 13 4.8 37 13.8 6 2.2 1.52
*Definition of acronyms:
WR: Immediate write off of goodwill directly to balance sheet reserves in the year of acquisition;
A1: Amortize goodwill for 20 years or more;
A2: Amortize goodwill for 10 to 19 years;
A3: Amortize goodwill for less then 10 years;
WI: Immediate write off of goodwill to the income statement in the year of acquisition.
Mean
Score
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accounting choice varies by industry
indicating that it is an important firm
characteristic. Industry placement can
affect accounting policy choice. The
reason is that differing industries are
subject to different pressure and ex-
pectations. Additionally, an Asia Pa-
cific viewpoint, Chong et al. (2000)
note that the choice of accounting
measurement policy is affected by a
hybrid of interacting forces.
Sample companies from the five
countries are grouped into eight indus-
try groups based on the International
Standard Industrial Classification of
all Economic Activities (ISIC Rev.
3.1). In line with the procedure adopted
by Williams (1998), this study pro-
duced the industry classifications as
follows: Core, Resources, Diverse,
Food, Chemicals, Services, Retail, and
Property groups, respectively. Table 5
presents the distribution of manage-
ments’ choice of the goodwill treat-
ment methods across the industry
groups.
The mean score of goodwill treat-
ments across industry groups ranges
from 1.34 to 1.73 out of 2. The highest
mean score comes from the core and
chemicals industry groups (1.73 and
1.70, respectively) while retail and food
industry groups yielded the lowest
mean score (1.38 and 1.34, respec-
tively). Table 5 also reveals that the
companies tend to fall into two differ-
ent groups. One group (core, chemi-
cals, services, and property) uses more
income-increasing techniques,
whereas, the second group (diverse,
resources, retail, and food) applies
more income-decreasing techniques.
The mean score for all 269 companies
is 1.52 out of 2.
The majority of companies (31.6%
or 37 out of 117 companies) that wrote
off their goodwill to reserves come
from core companies group. 29.2 per-
cent (28 out of 96 companies) of com-
panies that amortize their goodwill for
more than 20 years come from retail
group companies. None of companies
in the diverse group amortized their
goodwill for 10 to 19 years and none of
companies in the chemicals industry
classification amortized their good-
will for less then 10 years. Companies
that wrote off their goodwill directly
to their income statement were from
four industry groups that were core,
chemicals, retail, and property groups.
Industry Effects
Table 6 reports the result of the
one way ANOVA (Panel A) and the
post hoc tests (Panel B). Panel A, Table
6, indicates that significant differences
exist among the means of the account-
ing scores of the goodwill treatment
methods across industry groups with a
p value of .006. The results of post hoc
Tukey’s tests (Table 6 Panel B) sup-
port the finding that the significant
difference exists between the core com-
panies and two other industry groups:
food companies group (p value of .035)
and retail group (p value of .014). The
majority of companies in the core in-
dustry group (69.8%) wrote off their
goodwill to reserves in the year of
acquisition (most income-increasing),
while the majority of companies in the
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food and retail industry groups amor-
tized their goodwill in period of 20
years or more (most income-decreas-
ing).
This indicates that the nature of
the business in the food industry group
is more conservative compared to that
of the other groups. Companies in the
core industry group tend to use in-
come-increasing techniques possibly
because these companies are more
aggressive in attracting prospective
investors through a higher reported
accounting income. Compared to other
industry groups, this industry is also
perceived as more speculative.
Whereas, companies in the food in-
dustry group (which are in a more
visible industry group with potentially
higher political scrutiny) may well
choose a more conservative path.
In summary, accounting tech-
niques for the treatment of goodwill
varies significantly across countries
and industry groups and plausible ex-
planations have been discussed.
Statistical Findings and
Implications
The independent variables are
measured as follow. In this study, Prof
is profitability proxied by the ratio of
operating profit divided by operating
revenues. Lev is leverage proxied by
total book value of long-term debt di-
vided by total book value of equity.
Size is measured by total assets at the
end of the financial year in US$ and
logged to reduce skewness. Owncon
or the ownership concentration is the
percentage of the sum of all the owner-
Table 6 Univariate Analysis of Goodwill Treatment Choices Across Industry
Groups
Panel A: One-way ANOVA
Significant at .006*
Panel B: One-way ANOVA – Tukey’s post hoc tests
Industry Resources Diverse Food Chemicals Services Retail Property
Core .187 .547 .035 ** 1.000 .993 .014 ** .990
Resources 1.000 .998 .630 .881 1.000 .888
Diverse .998 .834 .967 1.000 .970
Food .291 .546 1.000 .553
Chemicals 1.000 .282 1.000
Services .553 1.000
Retail .560
* Highly significant at p < .01 level; ** Significant at p < .05 level.
*** Moderately significant at p < .10 level.
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ship representing 10 percent or more
of the total issued share capital. IOS or
Investment Opportunity Set measures
gross property, plant, and equipment
(at historic cost) divided by the market
value of the firm where market value
of the firm is equal to market value of
equity plus book value of debt. AIP or
Assets in Place is the ratio of the book
value of total property, plant, and equip-
ment (PPE) to total assets. Table 7
presents the descriptive statistics of
the three economic variables derived
from the traditional Costly Contract-
ing Theory and the control variables.
The Profitability (Prof) variable
indicates that in the year of study the
average of the company profitability is
negative 2 percent. Financial leverage
(Lev variable) is proxied by total book
value of long-term debt divided by
total book value of equity. The mean
of the companies’ financial leverage is
13 percent, which is relatively low.
The maximum of companies’ finan-
cial leverages reporting goodwill is 64
percent which is from a company listed
in the Jakarta Sock Exchange. Total
assets of the overall companies range
from US$ 3 million, which is the small-
est company, to US$ 13,902 million,
which is the largest company, and the
average is US462 million. The small-
est company is listed on the Singapore
Stock Exchange while the largest com-
pany is listed on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange. Total assets is highly
skewed, therefore it is logged
(Tabachnick and Fidell 1996).
Ownership concentration is
thought to be an effective monitoring
mechanism and reduce opportunistic
conduct in respect to management’s
choice of accounting policies. The
mean of companies’ ownership con-
centration for the overall sample com-
panies is 26 percent. The investment
opportunity set (IOS) measures gross
property, plant, and equipment (at his-
toric cost) divided by the market value
of the firm where market value of the
firm is equal to market value of equity
plus book value of debt. The overall
mean of IOS is 44 percent. Among the
five countries of study, the mean of
IOS of Australian companies is the
Table 7. The Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Variables N Mean Min Max SD Skewness
Profitability (Prof) 269 -.02 -3.32 .88 .48 -4.2
Leverage (Lev) 269 .13 0 .64 .15 1.33
Total Assets (Million US$) 269 462 3 13,902 1,290 6.6
LogTA (Size) 269 8.08 6.40 10.14 .66 .43
Ownership concentration (OwnCon) 266 .26 0 .98 .21 .47
Investment Opportunity set (IOS) 235 .44 0 1.51 .35 .89
Assets-in-place (AIP) 269 .31 .0005 .84 .27 .59
n: sample size and excluded samples that have any missing values.
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lowest (40%) whereas that of Malay-
sian companies is the highest (58%).
Assets-in-place (AIP variable) is the
ratio of the book value of total prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (PPE) to
total assets. The mean of AIP is 31
percent with a minimum of 0 and maxi-
mum of 84 percent.
Table 8 presents the correlation
matrix between the independent vari-
ables. Table 8 shows that in general the
level of correlations between the inde-
pendent variable are low. The highest
correlation exists between IOS and
AIP with correlation value of .588.
This indicates that concerns about
multicollinearity in the forthcoming
regression analysis are lessened.
The relationships between the
dependent variable and the predictors
are examined by using ordinal regres-
sion (McKelvey and Zavoina 1975).
The equation of the ordinal regression
is as follows:
P
Gw i
= a + b
1 
Prof
i
 + b
2
 Lev
i
 +
b
3
 Size
i
+ bC
1 
OwnCon
i
 +
C
2
 IOS
i 
+ C
3 
AIP
i
+ e (1)
Where, P
GW
 is probability [income in-
creasing (decreasing) accounting
policy choice tendency] for the treat-
ments of goodwill.
i is company specific
a is constant
b is coefficient variable
e is the error term
C is coefficient of the control vari-
ables
Table 9 shows the statistical re-
sults of the determinant factors of the
selection of goodwill treatments.
In examining the factors influenc-
ing management preferences in the
selection of accounting choice for
goodwill, this paper carried out ordi-
nal regressions in three different sets
of data. First, shown in Panel A Table
Table 8. Correlation Matrix for the Independent and Control Variables
Variables Prof Lev Size OwnCon IOS AIP Country
 (LogTA)
Prof 1.000
Leverage .129 1.000
Size (LogTA) .204 .375 ** 1.000
OwnCon .109 .031 -.063 1.000
IOS .194 ** -.077 -.025 .051 1.000
AIP .171 ** .228 ** -.073 .011 .588 * 1.000
Country .032 -.181 ** -.172 ** .238 ** .199 .156 * 1.000
Ind8 -.193 ** .032 .013 .079 -.195 ** -.128 * .058
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
(2-tailed).
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9, regressions 1 and 2 include all
sampled companies from the five coun-
tries. Since it can be argued that, among
the five countries, voluntary choices
of accounting for goodwill were not
identical, additional regressions analy-
sis were conducted and shown in Pan-
els B and C. Second, Panel B shows
the results from regressions 3 and 4
that included sampled companies from
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore
as these three countries had similar
methods to choose from. Third, with a
similar reason, regressions 5 and 6
include sampled companies from Aus-
tralia and Indonesia shown in Panel C.
Regressions 1, 3 and 5 examine the
influence of the traditional Costly Con-
tracting Theory variables on the good-
will treatment choices. Regressions 2,
Table 9. Results of Ordinal Regressions for the Determinants for
Management’s Choice of Accounting Techniques for the Treat-
ment of Goodwill
P
Gw I 
= a + b
1 
Prof
i
 + b
2
 Lev
i
 + b
3
 Size
i
+ b
4 
OwnCon
i
 + b
5
 IOS
i 
+ b
6
AIP
i
 + e
p-value and the predicted directionality sign
Regression N Prof Lev Size OwnCon IOS AIP
Panel A. Five countries: Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore
1 269 n.s .000* .003* .000* .072
+ - +
2 232 n.s. .012** .020** n.s- n.s. n.s. .032** .063
+ - + - - -
Panel B. Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore
3 197 n.s n.s. .034** .040** .033
+ - +
4 170 n.s n.s. .052*** n.s. n.s. n.s. .035* .034
+ - + - - -
Panel C. Australia and Indonesia
5 72 n.s. n.s. .063*** n.s. .068
+ - +
6 62 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s .101
+ - + - - -
n: sample size for the regression
A) Significance of -2 Log Likelihood for model fitting information, (B) Pseudo R-Square-
Nagelkerke.
* Highly significant at p < .01 level. ** Significant at p < .05 level.
Overall p-
value (A)
Pseudo
R-Square (B)
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4 and 6 examine the influence of the
three CCT variables and control vari-
ables on the goodwill treatment choice.
The statistical results presented in
Panel A, Table 9 shows that the R-
square for the first regression that in-
cludes solely CCT variables is .072.
The statistical analysis shows that there
are positive relationships between the
Profitability variable and management
selection for accounting techniques for
goodwill from all regressions carried
out. However, this variable is consis-
tently not a significant variable. Thus,
H1 is not supported. The results of the
statistical analysis from the three data
sets (Panels A, B, and C) are consis-
tent.
A possible explanation is that com-
panies with a low profitability figure
or in a loss situation have little or no
incentive to increase the number.
Therefore, accounting policy choices
are less important. As suggested by
Healy (1985), the upper and lower
bounds in compensation contracts pro-
vide a manager an incentive toward
‘bath-taking’ behavior, that is when
earnings are already below expecta-
tion or are negative for a certain pe-
riod, managers may expense as many
costs as possible in that period in order
to have a much better performance in
the following period. Another plau-
sible explanation is related to Skinner’s
(1993) belief that managers’ account-
ing policy choices are a function of
firms’ long-term but not short term
earnings performance.
Regression 1 in Table 9 also indi-
cates that leverage is a highly signifi-
cant predictor of accounting choice of
goodwill treatments with a p value of
.000. This regression includes the three
traditional Costly Contracting Theory
variables and it incorporates sampled
companies from the five countries.
However, the directionality signs are
consistently negative indicating that
the higher (lower) a company’s lever-
age ratio, the more likely the company
selects an income-decreasing (increas-
ing) goodwill treatment method. Le-
verage does help to predict the good-
will treatment method but Hypothesis
2 is not supported due to the reverse
directionality sign. Additionally, Pan-
els A and B show that leverage is an
insignificant predictor.
The different finding of this study
might be due to the fact that the overall
mean of financial leverage of sample
companies in this study is low (13%).7
This shows that, on average, compa-
nies were not at all close to violating
their debt covenant agreements. Thus,
there is no direct motivation to reduce
leverage via accounting policy choices.
Another plausible explanation is that
the immediate write-off of goodwill
7 In line with Skinner (1993), this study used the ratio of book value of long term debt divided
by the book value of total assets to proxy financial leverage. Skinner classified his sample into two
categories; firms with accounting-based debt covenants (mean of leverage is 25.1%) and firms
without accounting based debt covenants (mean of leverage is 13.8%). However, this study could
not actually ascertain the actual firms’ debt covenant contracts given the fact that such data is not
publicly available information.
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into the income statement (in this study
it is categorized as the most income-
decreasing goodwill technique) will
reduce shareholders’ equity in the year
acquisition, thus, potentially restrict-
ing the firms’ ability to declare a divi-
dend. Therefore, firms with higher le-
verage ratios might not need to pursue
income-increasing techniques to gen-
erate a better reported income because
this would lead to a perception that the
firms’ good performance should result
in a higher dividend distribution. This
study postulates that the accounting
choices decisions may be influenced
by a firm’s financial difficulties rather
than attempts to avoid debt covenant
violations.
The result from regression 1 indi-
cates that Size is a highly significant
predictor with a p value. 003 (see Panel
A Table 9) when the regression in-
cludes all three Costly Contracting
Theory variables. This suggests that
Size does help to predict the goodwill
treatment method choices. However,
the predicted directionality sign is posi-
tive indicating that the higher a
company’s size, the more likely the
company selects an income-increas-
ing goodwill treatment method. Thus,
H3 is not supported due to the reverse
directionality sign. The finding of
goodwill treatment method choices in
this study is not consistent with the
Costly Contracting Theory hypothesis
where large companies have an incen-
tive to select more income-decreasing
techniques (Watts and Zimmerman
1986). This study shows that larger
companies are more likely to select
income-increasing goodwill treat-
ments. The most radical is the method
to immediately write off the goodwill
to reserves in the year of acquisition
(Gore et al. 2002). Most (90.9%) Hong
Kong companies wrote off their good-
will to reserves balance sheet in the
year of acquisition and those compa-
nies were the larger companies in the
sample.
Although the relevant IAS (IASC
1999) precludes immediate written-
off, virtually all the Hong Kong com-
panies pursue this income-increasing
technique. Those large companies in
Hong Kong may have pursued such an
income-increasing technique for good-
will possibly because they had antici-
pated the change of regulation regard-
ing goodwill treatment. SSAP 30 (Busi-
ness Combinations) of Hong Kong
accounting standards becoming effec-
tive for annual financial statements
covering periods beginning on or after
1 January 20018 regulates that good-
will can no longer be written off imme-
diately in the year of acquisition. Thus,
the dramatic goodwill treatment in writ-
ing off all goodwill to balance sheet
reserves in the year of acquisition is an
interesting unique feature of Hong
Kong companies before SSAP 30 pro-
hibited this method. This issue also
8 This study uses companies’ annual reports for period end ranges from December 2000 to
September 2001. Therefore, the new Hong Kong goodwill rule came into affect after the sample
period.
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explains the finding that management
preferences for the selection of good-
will treatments are significantly dif-
ferent. As also shown in Panels B and
C that Size variable is only partially
explain accounting choice for good-
will.
To ascertain the robustness of the
statistical finding from examining the
influence of economic variables on
management’s selection for an ac-
counting technique for goodwill this
study also examines the control vari-
ables. However, the level of the own-
ership concentration as a control vari-
able does not help explain mana-
gement’s choice of accounting poli-
cies for goodwill treatment and depre-
ciation methods. In regard to the good-
will treatment choice, this is possibly
because the event of company’s acqui-
sition is not a routine activity that
happens quite often in a particular
company. Thus, at the time of the
company’s acquisition of another com-
pany that generated goodwill, there
might be a completely different nature
or level of the company’s ownership
structure from that of the year of study.
Companies’ shareholders composition
may have fundamentally changed soon
after the goodwill acquisition process
is completed. The relationship between
two control variables, AIP and IOS as
proxy variables for companies’ growth
opportunities, and goodwill treatment
method choices are also analyzed.
However these two control variables
fail in explaining management’s choice
of the treatment for goodwill. Growth
opportunities may affect manage-
ment’s choice of the treatment of good-
will indirectly, through the firm’s con-
tracts (Skinner 1993).9
Conclusion
This study reveals very large vari-
ances in the accounting practices for
goodwill in the 2000/2001 sampled
companies across country of origins
and industry groups. The key focus of
this study is management’s choice of
accounting techniques for the treat-
ment of goodwill. Country as a key of
societal factors explains how manage-
ment preferences of accounting for
goodwill vary across nations. This
study also provides additional evidence
to back the findings of Watts and
Zimmerman (1978); Zmijewski and
Hagerman (1981); Foster (1986) and
Bowen et al. (1995) that firm industry
characteristics influence accounting
policy choices. Thus, it partially sup-
ports the position in the literature that
management’s accounting policy
choices are related to industry-spe-
cific concerns by providing empirical
evidence.
Statistical analysis indicates that
two of the three traditional Costly Con-
tracting Theory variables assist in ex-
plaining management preference of
accounting techniques for the treat-
ment of goodwill. However, the re-
9 Skinner (1993) links the IOS to debt contracts and management compensation plans that in turn
affect the choice of accounting policies. However, this study could not access such contracts.
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sults have to be interpreted carefully.
Two economic variables significantly
explain management preferences of
accounting for goodwill from the five
countries data set. The finding shows
that the higher a company’s financial
leverage ratio the company managers
prefer to write off goodwill immedi-
ately against income or to capitalize
and amortize it in a sorter period of
time (i.e. amortize it for less then 10
years). A plausible explanation for this
finding is that where a company has
debt covenant restrictions based on
balance sheet ratio, a positive associa-
tion between capitalization and amor-
tization based preferences and the pres-
ence of such restriction can be ex-
pected (Gore et al. 2000). However, if
debt covenant restrictions are based on
income statement-based ratios, com-
panies will prefer methods that do not
reduce profits (i.e. immediate write-
off to reserves methods). Another find-
ing is that the higher a company’s size,
the more likely the company would
write-off of goodwill to balance sheet
reserves. Hence, this study provides
empirical evidence based on account-
ing practices that management prefer-
ences of accounting for goodwill have
economic consequences.
This paper also provides evidence
by countries with like accounting stan-
dards. Thus, it shows the important
about the extent to which accounting
choice for goodwill are voluntary in
the various countries affect the expla-
nation of management preferences on
accounting for goodwill.
Future research could be pursued
in several directions. First, this study
observes that management’s selection
of accounting techniques for the treat-
ment of goodwill varies significantly
across nations. Country as a key of
societal factors could be examined in
future research to explain these na-
tional accounting differences. The pos-
sibilities include exploration of the
legal system, tax law, inflation level,
level of economic development, and
relationship between business enter-
prises and providers of capital
(Doupnik and Salter 1995).
Second, there is also a global
movement towards the ‘Assets Im-
pairment’ rule for goodwill which fore-
goes systematic annual amortization
and replaces it with the need to write
down (whatever expense is appropri-
ate) the value of goodwill that exceeds
its stated cost value. This new ap-
proach, in effect, generates a different
accounting policy choices decision: to
what degree (if any) does a company
write down its goodwill figure? To
what extent does a company choose an
income-decreasing accounting policy
choice? It is an open question that
whether the Assets Impairment rule
will lead to greater or lesser variance
in accounting policy effect on the in-
come statement. Future research can
scrutinize the implementation of the
new method.
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